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Abstract Arguments on legal evidence rely on generalizations, that link a certain
circumstance to a certain hypothesis and warrants the claim that the circumstance
makes the hypothesis more probable. Some generalizations are acceptable and others
are unacceptable. A generalization can be unacceptable on at least four different
grounds. A false generalization is unacceptable because membership in the reference
class does not increase the probability of the hypothesis. A non-robust generalization
is unacceptable because it uses a reference class that is too heterogeneous. A bias-
triggering generalization is unacceptable because decision makers are inclined to
overestimate the evidentiary value of membership in the reference class. A discrim-
inating generalization is unacceptable because it putsmembers in the reference class in
an unfair disadvantage. Research funded by the Swedish Research Council
(Vetenskapsra˚det).
Keywords Legal argumentation  Evidence  Generalization  Reference class 
Robustness  Discrimination
1 Introduction
The issues that are addressed in a court of law are traditionally divided into ‘‘issues
of law’’ and ‘‘issues of fact’’. Legal argumentation can therefore be divided into
arguments on issues of law and arguments on issues of fact. Arguments of the first
kind are concerned with legal interpretation. A legal argument on an issue of law
provides a reason for a certain interpretation of the law. Arguments of the second
kind are concerned with the assessment of legal evidence. A legal argument on an
issue of fact provides a reason for a certain assessment of evidence. Most studies on
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legal argumentation are concerned with arguments of the first kind. This article is
concerned with arguments of the second kind. It investigates arguments on legal
evidence in criminal trials.
An argument on legal evidence points to a certain piece of evidence and claims
that it increases the probability of a certain hypothesis. It should be noted that there
are many different kinds of hypotheses that can figure in a criminal trial. The
hypothesis could, for example, be that the defendant was at the crime scene around a
certain time, that the defendant had knowledge about some crucial circumstance, or
that the defendant had a certain motive. The hypothesis could also regard some
person other than the defendant. The hypothesis could, for example, be that
someone who has testified as a witness is unreliable.
Anderson et al. (2005: 60–63) have demonstrated that arguments on legal
evidence rely on generalizations. Every argument that points to a certain piece of
evidence, and claims that it increases the probability of a certain hypothesis, relies
on some kind of generalization that links the evidence to the hypothesis, and
justifies the claim that the evidence makes the hypothesis more probable. The
generalization is a warrant that justifies the conclusion about the hypothesis. In
some arguments, the generalization is stated explicitly as a premise in the argument.
In other cases, the generalization is a tacit premise that is logically necessary for the
argument to be valid. As an example of a tacit premise, the defense attorney in a
murder trial could direct the attention of the judge/jury to the fact that the crime
scene was very dark, and claim that this increases the probability that the
observation of a certain eye witness was mistaken. This argument relies on tacit
premise: the generalization that observations in the dark are more likely to be
mistaken.
As we shall see, a generalization connects two classes to each other. I will refer to
these classes as the ‘‘reference class’’ and the ‘‘target class’’. When an argument on
legal evidence points to a certain piece of evidence, it classifies the case at hand as
belonging to the reference class of cases where this kind of evidence is present, and
when the argument claims that the evidence increases the probability of a certain
hypothesis, it claims that membership in the reference class increases the probability
that the case belongs to the target class of cases where the hypothesis is true. The
generalization that observations in the dark are more likely to be mistaken links the
reference class ‘‘observations in the dark’’ to the target class ‘‘incorrect observations’’,
and claims that membership in the former increases membership in the latter.
The use of generalizations has been studied in argumentation theory. Prakken
et al. (2003: 39) have identified and modeled different ways in which an interlocutor
in a debate can attack a generalization (Bex et al. 2003: 141–142). One way to
attack a generalization is to attack its source. An argument claiming that it is
‘‘general knowledge’’ that observations made in the dark are more likely to be
mistaken can, accordingly, be attacked by questioning general knowledge as a
reliable source of information. A different way to attack a generalization is to attack
the generalization itself. An attack of this kind could, for example, dispute the
generalization that observations made in the dark are more likely to be mistaken, by
claiming that this is empirically false. A third way to attack a generalization is to say
that the generalization is correct as a generalization, but leads to a false conclusion
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when applied to the specific case at hand, due to special circumstances in this case.
An attack of this kind could, for example, admit that observations in the dark are
generally more likely to be mistaken, but claim that the particular observation made
by the eye witness is not likely to be mistaken, since the witness was using night
goggles. These distinctions map out different strategies that a trial lawyer could use
in argumentation in front of the judge/jury to attack arguments from the opposing
side.
In this article, I will investigate attacks of the second kind. I will investigate
attacks on the generalization itself, as a generalization. As I intend to demonstrate,
such attacks can attack the generalization on different grounds that should be
distinguished from each other. In the example above, the interlocutor launches an
attack on the generalization itself, by claiming that it is a false generalization. This
is one ground for attack. As I intend to show, there are at least four different grounds
on which a generalization can be attacked, as a generalization, that should be
distinguish from each other.
Argumentation can be analyzed from different perspectives. In this article, I will
investigate arguments that rely on generalizations from the perspective of a decision
maker who is presented with arguments, and has to assess to what extent they are
sound. This is the situation that faces a judge or jury with regard to legal evidence.
The prosecution and the defense make arguments on the interpretation and
evaluation of the evidence, and the judge/jury has to assess to what extent the
arguments that are advanced in favor of a certain decision actually provide
justification for that decision. The judge/jury has to scrutinize if the arguments are
logically valid and rely on premises that are acceptable. A premise can be
unacceptable in different ways. A descriptive premises is unacceptable if it is
epistemically incorrect. A normative premises is unacceptable to the decision maker
if he or she finds it morally incorrect. With regard to generalizations, this means that
the judge/jury has to assess if the generalizations that are used in the arguments that
are presented to them are epistemically and morally acceptable.
Twining says that generalizations are ‘‘necessary but dangerous’’ (Twining 1999:
357). In this article, I will show that generalizations can be unacceptable on
different grounds that should be distinguished from each other. I will show that
there are at least four distinctly different grounds for judging a generalization
unacceptable. I will distinguish between false generalizations (Sect. 5), non-robust
generalizations (Sect. 6), bias-triggering generalizations (Sect. 7) and discriminat-
ing generalizations (Sect. 8). The first three are unacceptable on epistemic or
cognitive grounds, while the fourth is unacceptable on moral grounds. A false
generalization is unacceptable because membership in the reference class does not
increase the probability of membership in the target class, a non-robust general-
ization is unacceptable because it uses a reference class that is too heterogeneous, a
bias-triggering generalization is unacceptable because decision makers are inclined
to overestimate the probability of membership in the target class, and a
discriminating generalization is unacceptable because it puts members in the
reference class at a morally unacceptable disadvantage. In this article I will
investigate each of them in turn, and analyze the grounds for judging them
unacceptable.
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The purpose of this analysis is to facilitate the assessment of generalizations in
argument about legal evidence by providing some theoretical distinctions. I hope
that the distinctions that I propose can help judges and juries think in a clear and
structured way about generalizations that they find problematic. At the end of my
investigation, I will offer a check list of critical questions that can be used by legal
decision makers when they assess arguments about legal evidence.
It is not the aim of this study to describe how legal decision makers actually
assess arguments on legal evidence. I will not investigate which generalizations are
accepted by judges and juries, and which are not. Neither is the purpose of this study
to argue which generalizations ought to be accepted, and which ought not to be
accepted, in my view. The purpose is merely to provide some theoretical
distinctions that I hope will be helpful for a legal decision maker. The distinctions
that I make in this investigation provide a vocabulary for identifying and separating
different grounds for classifying a generalization as acceptable or unacceptable in
arguments on legal evidence. This is important for the assessment of legal evidence
by legal decision makers. I hope that it will enhance the clarity of such assessments
and make them more reasoned.
2 Acceptable and Unacceptable Generalizations
As we have seen, all arguments on legal evidence rely on generalizations. Some
generalizations are so trivial and uncontroversial that judges and jurors do not even
think about them as premises in the argument. Other generalizations are
problematic, and there are some arguments that trade on generalizations that are
unacceptable. Generalizations where membership in a certain social group is
connected with a certain feature and generalizations where a claim about a person’s
character based on past behavior are examples of generalizations that can be
problematic and judged unacceptable. These generalizations are used in ad
hominem arguments, for example in arguments that attack the credibility of a
witness (Macagno and Walton 2012: 20).
The following list provides five examples of arguments on legal evidence. It
starts with an argument that relies on the familiar generalization that observations in
the dark are more likely to be mistaken, and proceeds with arguments that are more
problematic.
(A1) WZ testifies as a witness for the prosecution in a burglary case, and says that
he drove passed the crime scene and saw a man loading some boxes into a
van. WZ says it was too dark to see what the man looked like, but the van
appeared to be blue. The defense attorney comments on WZ’s testimony in
his closing statement, and makes the following argument: ‘‘It is common
knowledge that colors are harder to distinguish in the dark. In places with
low illumination, blue can be mistaken for green and vice versa. WZ testified
that the car was blue, but this observation could be mistaken. The crime




(A2) YP testifies as a witness for the defense in a burglary trial. YP is the
defendant’s mother, and provides the defendant with an alibi. According to
YP, the defendant was watching TV at her house when the burglary took
place. The prosecutor questions the credibility of YP’s alibi in his cross
examination and closing argument. According to the prosecutor: ‘‘We must
consider the possibility that YP was lying when she gave her testimony. It is
common knowledge that a mother would do anything to protect her child.
The fact that YP is the defendant’s mother therefore increases the probability
that she was lying when she gave him an alibi for the evening of the
burglary.’’
(A3) FD is standing trial for murder. According to the prosecution, FD killed his
neighbor MM with a shotgun. FD’s wife ND testifies for the prosecution and
says that FD shot MM. FD claims that he is innocent and that it was ND who
killed MM. The forensic investigation found FD’s fingerprints as well as
ND’s fingerprints on the shotgun. The prosecutor uses crime statistics as an
argument against FD: ‘‘Only 8 % of homicide offenders are women. It is
therefore highly probable that it was FD rather than ND who shot MM.’’
(A4) HK is standing trial for shoplifting. HK is born in Somalia, and the
prosecutor submits crime statistics as evidence to show that people of Somali
origin are overrepresented by a factor of seven among convicted shoplifters.
According to prosecutor, these statistics strengthen the case against HK:
‘‘The fact that shoplifting is more common among people of Somali origin
does not necessarily mean that HK committed this particular offense, but it
does increase the probability.’’
(A5) TL is standing trial for drug dealing. TL has three previous convictions for
the same offense, and the prosecutor argues that this increases the probability
that TL is guilty in the present case: ‘‘Previous convictions for the same
offense show that TL is disposed to commit this kind crime. They make it
substantially more probable that he is guilty.’’
Some of these arguments are more problematic than others. In my experience
most judges find (A1) and (A2) acceptable, and assess (A3) and (A4) as
unacceptable. (A5) seems to be the most controversial argument on the list. In
some legal systems prior conviction is admissible as evidence for guilt, in others it is
inadmissible. The Swedish legal system is an example of the former. In a survey that
I conducted on 261 Swedish judges 61 % accepted the generalization that prior
conviction for the same offense increases the probability that the defendant is guilty,
and 39 % found this generalization unacceptable (Dahlman 2015: 11).
The notion that some generalizations are acceptable while others are unaccept-
able raises several questions. Fundamentally, it raises the question, on what ground
a generalization is judged as unacceptable. What, exactly, is wrong with the
generalizations that are unacceptable that is not the case with acceptable general-
izations? In the following, I will discuss different grounds for judging a
generalization unacceptable.
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3 Unacceptable Categorically and Non-categorically
When we talk about generalizations that are unacceptable an important distinction
should be made between claims of two different kinds: the claim that it is always
unacceptable to use a certain circumstance as evidence for a certain hypothesis, and
the claim that a certain argument that uses the circumstance as evidence is
unacceptable. In the former case, the generalization is categorically unacceptable.
In the latter case, it is unacceptable but the unacceptability is not categorical. The
generalization is non-categorically unacceptable. The claim that a certain gener-
alization is categorically unacceptable says that all arguments that use the
circumstance as evidence for the hypothesis are unacceptable. The non-categorical
claim only says that a certain argument uses the circumstance in an unaccept-
able way, and does not rule out that there could be other arguments that use the
circumstance as evidence in an acceptable way. This distinction is related to the
distinction introduced by Prakken, Bex, Reed and Walton (see section one above)
between ‘‘attacks on the generalization itself’’ and ‘‘attacks on a specific application
of a generalization’’. It is also similar to Terence Anderson’s distinction between
‘‘synthetic-intuitive generalizations’’ and ‘‘context-specific’’ generalizations (An-
derson 1999: 459–460).
The difference between the judgment that a generalization is categorically
unacceptable and the judgment that it is non-categorically unacceptable can be
illustrated with argument (A5). According to the prosecutor, the defendant’s prior
convictions for the same offense make it substantially more probable that he is
guilty. A legal decision maker could find this argument unacceptable in two
different ways.
1. The decision maker says that the use of prior convictions as evidence for guilt is
categorically unacceptable. Prior conviction should be inadmissible as evidence
for guilt.
2. The decision maker says that arguments that use prior conviction as evidence
for guilt are not necessarily unacceptable, but claim that this particular
argument is unacceptable as it exaggerates the evidentiary value of the prior
conviction. It might be true that prior conviction for the same offense makes it
slightly more probable that the defendant is guilty, but it does make it
‘‘substantially more probable’’.
As we shall see, some grounds for classifying a generalization as unaccept-
able render the generalization unacceptable categorically and others non-categor-
ically. The primary focus of this investigation is to identify different grounds for




A generalization points to a certain piece of evidence and classifies the case at hand
as belonging to the reference class (E) of cases where this kind of evidence is
present, and claims that this is evidence for a certain hypothesis, in the sense that
membership in the reference class increases the probability that the case belongs to
the target class (H) of cases where the hypothesis is true. The generalization says
that knowledge that a certain observation belongs to the reference class makes it
more probable ceteris paribus that it belongs to the target class. The probability that
a case belongs to the target class (H), given that the case belongs to the reference
class (E), is higher than the probability that the case belongs to the target class (H),
when it is not given whether the case belongs to the reference class or not,
P(H|E)[ P(H). As an example, the generalization in (A1) says that the probability
that an observation is mistaken, given the information that it was made in the dark,
is higher than the probability that it is mistaken, given that we are ignorant about the
light conditions when the observation was made. For this to be true membership in
the target class must be more likely in the reference class than in cases in general.
Incorrect observations must be more common among observations in the dark than
among observations in general, P(H&E)/P(E)[ P(H).
Let us assume that there are 100 cases, and in each case an eyewitness testifies
about the color of a van. In 20 cases it was dark when the witness observed the van,
and in 80 cases the witness observed the van in good light. Among the 20 cases
where the witness observed the van in the dark, the observation was correct (the van
actually had the color that the witness named) in 16 cases and incorrect in 4 cases.
Among the 80 cases where the witness observed the van in good light, the
observation was correct in 79 cases and incorrect in 1 case. See Fig. 1.
If we pick a case at random among these 100 cases, the probability that the
observation is incorrect, if we do not know whether the witness observed the van in
the dark or in good light, P(H), is 5/100 = 0.05. The probability that the observation
is incorrect, given that the observation was made in the dark, P(H&E)/P(E), is (4/
100)/(20/100) = 0.20. This means that the circumstance that the observation was
made in the dark increases the probability of the hypothesis that the observation is
incorrect. If we learn that the observation was made in the dark, the probability that
the testimony is incorrect increases from 5 to 20 %. This assumes, of course, that
there is no other evidence. If there is another circumstance that increases the
4
observations in the dark (E)                incorrect observation (H)  
1 16
79
Fig. 1 ‘‘Observation in the dark’’ as evidence for ‘‘incorrect observation’’
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probability that the observation is incorrect, independently of the evidence that the
observation was made in the dark, e.g. that the witness has bad eye sight, the
combined probability that the observation is incorrect will, of course, be higher than
20 %, and, if there is another circumstance that decreases the probability that the
observation is incorrect, the combined probability will be lower than 20 %. In any
case, the circumstance that it was dark when the witness observed the van makes it
more probable that the observation is incorrect, as incorrect observations are more
frequent among cases where the observation was made in the dark than among cases
in general. The effect that E has on the probability of H depends on the value of
other evidence. Let us, for example, assume that, due to other circumstances, the
probability of the testimony being incorrect is 60 % before we receive the
information that the observation was made in the dark. In this situation the
probability that the observation is incorrect increases from 60 to 88 % when we take
into account that the observation was made in the dark.1
5 False Generalizations
The circumstance that a case belongs to a certain reference class makes it more
probable that the case belongs to a certain target class, if and only if membership in
the target class is more common among cases in the reference class than among
cases in general. Notice that it is not sufficient that membership in the target class is
common in the reference class.2 It needs to be more common among cases in the
reference class than among cases in general.
This principle can be illustrated with argument (A5) as an example. (A5) is based
on the generalization that prior conviction for the same offense makes it more
probable that the defendant is guilty. Is this generalization true or false? This
depends on whether guilty defendants are more common among defendants with a
prior conviction for the same offense than among defendants in general. Let us
assume that there are 100 cases, and in 60 of these cases the defendant has been
previously convicted for the same offense. Out of the 100 cases, there are 70 cases
where the defendant is guilty and 30 cases where the defendant is actually innocent.
Among the 70 defendants that are guilty most defendants have a prior conviction for
the same offense. 40 of the guilty defendants have been previously convicted for the
same offense and 30 guilty defendants have not. If we look at the 30 defendants who
1 The probability can be calculated with Bayes’ theorem: P(H|E)/P(-H|E) = P(H)/P(-H) 9 P(E|H)/
P(E|-H).
In the given example, there is a 60 % probability that the observation is incorrect before we take
account of the evidence that it was dark when the witness observed the van, i.e. P(H) = 0.60. The
probability that the observation is correct, P(-H), is 1 - P(H), and this means that
P(-H) = 1 - 0.60 = 0.40, and that P(H)/P(-H) = 0.60/0.40 = 1.5. P(E|H)/P(E|-H) is known as the
likelihood ratio, and can be understood as the evidentiary force of the evidence vis-a-vis the hypothesis.
Since P(E|H) = P(E&H)/P(H) and P(E|-H) = P(E&-H)/P(-H), the likelihood ratio can be calculated
as [(4/100)/(5/100)]/[(16/100)/(95/100)] = 4.75. If we put these numbers into Bayes’ theorem we get
P(H|E)/P(-H|E) = 1.5 9 4.75 = 7.125. Since P(H|E) = 1 - P(-H|E), we can find P(H|E) by solving
the equation P(H|E)/(1 - P(H|E)) = 7.125. Thus, P(H|E) = 7.125/8.125 & 0.88.
2 There is an article by David Wasserman where he makes this error (Wasserman 1991: 944).
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are innocent it is also the case that most defendants have a prior conviction for the
same offense, since the police have a selection bias towards people with a prior
conviction for the same offense when they pick suspects, and this increases the risk
for convicted felons to be wrongfully prosecuted for crimes they did not commit. 20
of the innocent defendants have been previously convicted for the same offense, and
10 innocent defendants have not. See Fig. 2.
This means that membership in the target class is common in the reference class.
Being guilty is common among defendants with a prior conviction for the same
offense. As a matter of fact 67 % of the defendants with a prior conviction for the
same offense are guilty, P(H&E)/P(E) = (40/100) (60/100) & 0.67, but this does
not mean that membership in the reference class (prior conviction for the same
offense) makes it more probable that a person is a member of the target class
(guilty), since membership in the target class is not more common in the reference
class than among the general population. On the contrary, the probability that a
randomly picked defendant is guilty is 70 %, P(H) = 0.70. This means that the
probability that the defendant is guilty decreases from 70 to 67 %, when we are
informed that the defendant has been previously convicted for the same offense.
Given the numbers in Fig. 2, the generalization that ‘‘prior conviction for the same
offense makes it more probable that the defendant is guilty’’ is a false
generalization.
It is important to distinguish between true generalizations and false generaliza-
tions. In a true generalization the claim that membership in the reference class
makes it more probable that the case belongs to the target class is empirically
correct. In a false generalization, this claim is empirically incorrect. The distinction
has been stressed by Frederick Schauer as the distinction between ‘‘spurious
generalizations’’ and ‘‘non-spurious generalizations’’ (Schauer 2003: 7).
Let us examine arguments (A1), (A2), (A3), (A4) and (A5) to see if they are
based on true generalizations or false generalizations. As we have seen, it must be
the case that membership in the target class is more common among cases in the
reference class than among cases in general. If this is not the case, the generalization
is false.
(A1) depends on the empirical correctness of the following claim:
    20                        40                    30 
         10 
prior conviction (E)             guilty (H)
Fig. 2 ‘‘Prior conviction’’ as evidence for ‘‘guilty’’
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Observations where a green car is mistakenly perceived as blue are more
common among observations that are made in the dark than among
observations in general.
This is true. Blue and green are more difficult to distinguish from each other in
the dark. In low illumination the sensitivity of the human eye shifts towards the blue
end of the color spectrum, and this can make green or black objects appear blue.
(A2) depends on the empirical correctness of the following claim:
Testimony that provides a false alibi is more common among testimony given
by the defendant’s mother than among testimony in general.
This is probably true. All mothers are not prepared to lie under oath to protect
their children, but it seems reasonable to assume that false alibis are more common
among mothers than among witnesses in general.
(A3) depends on the empirical correctness of the following claim:
In murder cases, guilty defendants are more common among male defendants.
This seems to be true. There is a wide agreement among criminologists that more
than 90 % of all murders are committed by men. We can therefore assume that
roughly the same proportion of guilty defendants are men. The proportion of men
among innocent defendants, on the other hand, ought to be lower, since men only
make up 50 % of the total population of innocents. This means that the
generalization is correct. Guilty defendants are more common among male
defendants than among defendants in general.
(A4) depends on the empirical correctness of the following claim:
In shoplifting cases, guilty defendants are more common among defendants of
Somali origin than among defendants in general.
It is uncertain if this is true or false. It is supported by recent Danish statistics,
showing that convictions for shoplifting are 7.3 times more frequent among people
of Somali origin living in Denmark than among the Danish population in general.3 It
should be pointed out that this statistic does not necessarily mean that people of
Somali origin are overrepresented among guilty defendants. That they are
overrepresented with regard to conviction could be caused by bias towards people
from Somalia in the Danish legal system.
(A5) depends on the empirical correctness of the following claim:
Guilty defendants are more common among defendants who have been
previously convicted for the same offense than among defendants in general.
This is probably incorrect for reasons that I have presented in a previous study
(Dahlman 2015). The police have a strong selection bias towards people with a prior
conviction for the same offense, when they pick possible suspects, and this leads to
a situation where ex convicts are more likely to be prosecuted for a crime they did
not commit than people in general. Research shows that the number one cause of




wrongful prosecution is mistaken photo identification, where an eyewitness is
presented with pictures of people with a prior conviction for the same offense, and
picks an innocent person that resembles the real perpetrator (McConville et al. 1991:
23–24; Martin 2002: 856; Huff 2003: 16; Fitzgerald 2009: 5). This suggests that
innocent defendants are more common among defendants who have been previously
convicted for the same offense than among defendants in general, and that means
that (A5) relies on a false generalization. Prior conviction for the same offense does
not make it more probable that the defendant is guilty. On the contrary, it makes it
less probable that the defendant is guilty.
6 Non-robust Generalizations
Argument (A3) relies on the generalization that it is more probable that the
defendant is guilty if he is a man. As we have seen, this is empirically correct, but
there is something deeply problematic with this generalization even if it is true. A
generalization makes a claim about a class of cases but an argument on legal
evidence makes a claim about a specific case. Men as a group commit murder more
often than women as a group, but the defendant is a specific man, and it could be the
case that he is a peaceful man who would never hurt anyone. Is it really
acceptable to judge him on the actions of other men? The philosophical position
known as particularism responds to this problem by saying that a case shall be
judged on its particular circumstances, not on generalizations (Schauer 2003:
19–20). A person shall be judged on his or her individual merits and flaws, not on
the characteristics of some group that he or she happens to belong to (Lippert-
Rasmussen 2011: 48). As David Wasserman puts it, inferences about the guilt of a
defendant that are based on group generalizations ‘‘are inconsistent with the law’s
commitment to treat the defendant as an autonomous individual’’ (Wasserman 1991:
943).
Particularism may have some intuitive appeal, but is, actually, an impossible
idea, as all evidence relies on generalizations, in one way or the other. If we dismiss
every piece of evidence that relies on a generalization, we will have no evidence left
to judge the case. The impossibility of particularism has been demonstrated by
Schauer (2003: 75), Tillers (2005: 44); Stein (2005:65). Schauer shows that every
attempt to move beyond a certain generalization will only substitute the
generalization for another generalization (Schauer 2003: 67). This can be illustrated
with argument (A3). According to prosecutor, the fact that FD is a man makes it
highly probable that he, rather than his wife ND, fired the shotgun that killed the
neighbor MM. Let us assume that FD’s defense attorney objects to this line of
reasoning, and argues that it is unacceptable that FD shall be judged on the behavior
of men in general. FD’s defense attorney claims that FD is a peaceful and law
abiding man, and submits evidence on FD’s past behavior. According to the defense
attorney, FD should be judged on the basis of this character evidence. The defense
attorney may very well be right, but the approach that he suggests does not mean
that the case is assessed on particular circumstances instead of generalizations. It
only means that one generalization is substituted for another generalization. Instead
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of judging FD on a generalization about men in general, FD will be judged on a
generalization about men with a track record of good behavior.
The right approach to the problematic nature of generalizations is not to reject all
generalizations, but to recognize that some generalizations are more problematic
than others. It is, for example, more problematic to judge FD on the behavior of all
men than to judge him on the behavior of men with a track record of good behavior.
This is due to the fact that ‘‘male’’ is a more heterogeneous reference class than
‘‘male with a track record of good behavior’’ (Colyvan et al. 2001: 172). The
probability that a man is different from other men is higher than the probability that
a man with a track record of good behavior is different from other men with a track
record of good behavior. This can be described in terms of robustness. A judgment
that is based on a less heterogeneous reference class is more robust than a judgment
based on more heterogeneous reference class (Dahlman et al. 2015: 17–20).
Robustness measures sensitivity to additional information. That a judgment is more
robust means that it is less likely that it will be changed by additional information.
A generalization can be transformed into a more robust generalization by making
the reference class more specific. This transforms the reference class into a less
heterogeneous reference class. The reference class of cases where circumstance A is
present can be transformed into the more specific reference class of cases where ‘‘A
and B’’ are present, or the even more specific reference class ‘‘A and B and C’’. The
reference class ‘‘male’’ can, for example, be transformed into the more specific
reference class ‘‘male with a track record of good behavior’’ or the even more
specific ‘‘male over 65 with a track record of good behavior’’.
The prosecutor’s argument in (A3) can, therefore, be criticized with regard to
robustness. The objection against the prosecutor’s argument would go as follows
(Colyvan et al. 2001: 173): ‘‘It is true that FD is a man, and it is true that this
circumstance increases the probability that he is guilty, but I am not prepared to
settle with this. I want to place FD in a more specific reference class. I want to know
more about FD, to see if this changes the probability that he is guilty.’’ A problem
with this kind objection is that it can be raised against every argument that relies on
a generalization. It is always possible that a more specific reference class would
change the probability of H. This dilemma is known in probability theory as the
reference class problem (Reichenbach 1949: 374).
With regard to arguments on legal evidence the reference class problem can be
resolved by the principle that a generalization should not be accepted if the
reference class can be specified in a way that typically changes the probability of H.
If we know, for example, that considering track record typically changes the
probability of H, we have reason to classify a generalization that does not consider
track record as unacceptably non-robust. If an argument that relies on such a
generalization is presented, the lack of robustness is a ground for the judge/jury to
disregard it. According to this line of reasoning, generalizations that rely on
oversimplified statistics are unacceptable in argumentation on legal evidence (Stein
2005: 70). (A3) as well as (A4) ‘‘Somali origin’’, can be judged as unacceptable on
this ground.
It should be noticed, however, that the lack of robustness in (A3) and (A4) only
renders these generalizations unacceptable in the non-categorical sense. It does not
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make them categorically unacceptable. That (A3) is unacceptable because ‘‘male’’ is
a too heterogeneous reference class does not mean that ‘‘male’’ as a circumstance
should never be used as evidence for guilt. It does not rule out that a more specific
reference class that uses ‘‘male’’ as a circumstance in conjunction with other
circumstances, e.g. ‘‘male under twenty with a history of violent behavior’’, could
be sufficiently robust to be acceptable. And the same goes for (A4). That ‘‘Somali
origin’’ is insufficiently robust as a reference class does not mean that ‘‘Somali
origin’’ is unacceptable as one of the circumstances in a reference class. The view
that ‘‘Somali origin’’ is categorically unacceptable as evidence for guilt needs to be
justified by something more than lack of robustness.
7 Bias-Triggering Generalizations
There are situations where a decision maker believes that there is some truth to a
certain generalization, but is hesitant to accept the generalization, as it may trigger
bias. The decision maker fears that the generalization, if accepted, will be
overestimated and overused. Argument (A4) can serve as an example. Let us
assume that the generalization used in argument is true. Somali origin increases the
probability that the defendant is guilty, P(H|E)[ P(H). It only makes it slightly
more probable that the defendant is guilty, but it does increase the probability. A
decision maker may still be hesitant towards the acceptance of (A4), fearing that
such acceptance would lead to an exaggerated bias against people of Somali origin.
This could be a ground for a judge to decide that (A4) is unacceptable in arguments
about legal evidence.
The suspicion that the generalization will be overestimated and overused can be
related to a number of different agents. First of all, the judge may fear that the
acceptance of (A4) in a court of law may legitimize racism among the general
population (Schauer 2003: 35). Secondly, the judge may fear that it will encourage
bias among other judges. And, thirdly, the judge may doubt his own ability to
handle the generalization correctly, preferring to refrain from using it, to avoid the
risk of overestimating its evidentiary force. In the last case, the judge is tying
himself to the mast, like Ulysses, to avoid irrational judgment.
In legal systems where the evidence is assessed by a jury, the judge may fear that
the jurors will overestimate a certain generalization, and the judge will sometimes
prevent this from happening by declaring a certain piece of evidence inadmissible,
or instructing the jury to disregard it. According to the Federal Rules of Evidence
403, a judge can exclude relevant evidence if the judge finds that the probative value
P(H) P(H|E) Pbias(H|E)
0 0.5 1
Fig. 3 Overestimation of evidence
Unacceptable Generalizations in Arguments on Legal Evidence 95
123
is substantially outweighed by the jury’s prejudice about the evidence (Allen et al.
2011: 140–142). The situation is illustrated in Fig. 3.
P(H) is the probability that the defendant is guilty when the jury does not take
into account that he is of Somali origin. P(H|E) is the probability that the defendant
is guilty, given that he is of Somali origin, according to a non-biased juror who
makes a correct assessment. Pbias(H|E) is the probability that the defendant is guilty,
given that he is of Somali origin, according to the biased juror who overestimates
the evidentiary value of Somali origin. If the judge finds that the jurors are biased it
becomes problematic to accept that the jury uses this generalization.
It should be noticed that in such situations the jury will never get the probability
right. If the jury takes account of E the probability of H will be overestimated. If the
jury does not take account of E the probability of H will be underestimated. A
solution to this dilemma is to minimize the error. This means that the judge should
look at the difference between the correct probability and the assessed probability
when the jury does not take the evidence into account, P(H|E) - P(H), in
comparison to the difference between the correct probability and the assessed
probability when the jury takes the evidence into account, Pbias(H|E) - P(H|E). If
the latter exceeds the former, Pbias(H|E) - P(H|E)[P(H|E) - P(H), the error is
minimized if the judge instructs the jury that it is unacceptable to use Somali origin
as evidence of guilt. This is the solution provided in the Federal Rules of Evidence
403.
The idea that dilemmas of this nature shall be resolved by minimizing the error is
not without objection. The solution rests on the assumption that all errors are
equally undesirable, but this is not the case. Some errors are more undesirable than
others. The conviction of an innocent defendant is, for example, more undesirable
than setting a guilty defendant free. A judge should take this into account, when he
or she decides whether a certain circumstance should be admitted as evidence. In
our example above it lends further support to the conclusion that Somali origin
should not be accepted as evidence for guilt, but there are other situations where the
effect could go in the opposite direction, e.g. when we are dealing with character
evidence in favor of the defendant. Jeremy Bentham proposed that the dilemma
should be settled on the basis of a utilitarian calculus. Evidence should be dismissed
from consideration if the harm of this exclusion is smaller than the harm that would
ensue if the evidence were considered (Bentham 1962: 88). This means that it
makes a difference if we are dealing with an argument advanced by the prosecution,
where the generalization hurts the defendant, or an argument advanced by the
defense, where the generalization favors the defendant. Since the harm of a
wrongful conviction is greater than the harm of a wrongful acquittal, it takes less of
a bias for a generalization that hurts the defendant to be unacceptable.
8 Discriminating Generalizations
So far we have identified three different grounds for saying that a generalization is
unacceptable in arguments on legal evidence: false generalizations, non-robust
generalizations and bias-triggering generalizations. The first two are epistemic
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grounds, and the third is cognitive. I will now investigate a fourth ground that is
moral in nature—the notion that a generalization can be unacceptable categorically
because it discriminates people that belong to the reference class in an unfair way.
This would justify why the generalization in argument (A4) ‘‘Somali origin as
evidence for guilt’’ should be classified as unacceptable. It is important to notice that
we are now talking about acceptability in the categorical sense. We have seen above
that (A4) can be classified as unacceptable non-categorically due to lack of
robustness. We can now move one step further and classify (A4) as categorically
unacceptable on the grounds of discrimination.
The idea that (A4) is unacceptable because it discriminates people from Somalia
in an unfair way is appealing, but it needs to explain why ‘‘Somali origin’’ is
unacceptable, when other circumstances that also discriminate are acceptable. Why
is argument (A4) unacceptable, but argument (A2) acceptable? Why is it
acceptable to discriminate a mother who is giving her son an alibi? Does not
fairness require that she has the same possibility as other people to give the
defendant an alibi? At the end of the day, could we not say that every generalization
that makes an inference from a social group to an individual is discriminatory and
unfair? As you can see, this argument leads to particularism: every person has the
right to be judged on individual circumstances only, everything else is unfair
discrimination. To avoid this pitfall into particularism we need to distinguish
between acceptable discrimination and unacceptable discrimination, and we need a
moral ground for the distinction.
An important difference between the generalization that false alibis are especially
common among testimony given by the defendant’s mother and the generalization
that stealing is especially common among people of Somali origin is that the
negative impact for people of Somali origin from the latter generalization is much
greater than the negative impact for mothers from the former generalization
(Hellman 2008: 23). Consider the situation where the generalization that stealing is
especially common among people of Somali origin is generally used against people
from Somalia by legal decision makers. The cumulative effect of such a practice
puts people of Somali origin in a systematic disadvantage. A similar effect does not
ensue by the general use of the generalization that mothers will lie to protect their
children. This generalization does not make mothers systematically disadvantaged
in an unacceptable way. An assessment where (A2) is found to be acceptable while
(A4) is classified as categorically unacceptable can be justified on this ground.
That some generalizations have a greater cumulative effect than others can be
explained by several factors. First of all, some generalizations are applicable to
more situations than others. They can be used by decision makers in many different
contexts. Furthermore, some generalizations have a greater cumulative effect
because they are more available than others, in the sense that they require less effort
on the decision maker’s part. Generalizations that require little effort will be used
more often, and will, therefore, have greater cumulative impact. Research in
cognitive psychology has demonstrated that some generalizations are more
available to decision makers, as they come to mind more easily (Tversky and
Kahneman 1973: 207). Racial generalizations that play a considerable role in the
society where the decision maker is situated are more available to the decision
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maker. It should also be remembered, that an argument is more available when it is
effortless for the decision maker to determine that the case belongs to the reference
class (Segall 2012: 96). This is, for example, the case with reference classes that
relate to physical appearance, such as skin color.
9 Check List with Critical Questions
As we have seen, the judgment that a certain generalization is unacceptable in
arguments on legal evidence can be made on at least for different grounds that
should be separated from each other. I have distinguished between false
generalizations, non-robust generalizations, bias-triggering generalizations and
discriminating generalizations.
Judges and juries are presented with evidence and listen to arguments about the
evidence. It is important that they assess these arguments critically. A legal decision
maker must always question if the generalization that an argument relies on is
problematic, and, if it is problematic, specify on what ground, exactly. Argumen-
tation theory can help a decision maker in this task, by setting up a check list of
critical questions that reminds the decision maker of important issues and separate
the issues from each other. This methodology has been used successfully by Doug
Walton, and others (e.g. Walton 1997: 199–229). The following check list of critical
questions sums up the main results of my analysis in this article.
• Is the generalization empirically true or false, as a generalization?
Is membership in the target class more common in the reference class than
among cases in general?
• Is the generalization sufficiently robust?
Is the reference class homogenous or heterogeneous?
• Does the generalization trigger bias?
Is there a risk that the generalization, if accepted, will be overused or
overestimated?
• Is the generalization discriminating?
Does the generalization put people in the reference class at an unfair
disadvantage?
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